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Una señal es cualquier evento operacional detectado en las últimas 24h–30d: CVEs en KEV explotados activamente, advisories de vendor, exposición cloud, ransomware y avisos regulatorios. Cada señal se prioriza por gravedad, actualidad y coincidencias con tu perfil personal de inteligencia.

Para análisis editorial y noticias generales visita Noticias.

Priorizado con IA

La priorizacion, resumen y accion recomendada pueden estar enriquecidos por IA y heuristicas. La fuente original permanece visible para verificacion.

Señales registradas · last 7d
Señales (ventana)5
Última detecciónhace 8 h
Monitorizado porintelligence scouter
Acción Requerida

Sin señales clasificadas en esta categoría dentro de la ventana seleccionada.

Explotados & KEV

Sin señales clasificadas en esta categoría dentro de la ventana seleccionada. Catálogo histórico abajo.

Altas y críticas

Sin señales clasificadas en esta categoría dentro de la ventana seleccionada.

Ventana24h7d30d7d / 30d solo en ProSeveridadCríticaAltaLimpiar filtros
Fabricante mencionadoMicrosoft10Google8Linux7Siemens5Palo Alto Networks5PHP5GitHub5Zoom4Apache3Apple
✓

No priority signals demanding immediate attention.

La cola operativa está limpia en esta ventana. El scouter sigue monitorizando.

All5Action Required0Altas y críticas0Cloud & Identity1Monitor4
Cloud & IdentityMEDIAAltoIncidente (prensa)NEWCRAInteligencia operacional

From exposed secrets to managed credentials: Reducing credential risk across the application lifecycle

A recent software supply chain attack affecting tens of thousands of GitHub repositories highlights a security problem that is easy to underestimate: a credential does not stop being exposed simply because it has been deleted from the latest version of the code. Researchers uncovered a campaign in which attackers inserted a malicious GitHub Actions workflow into repositories they had permission to modify. Designed to look like a routine security audit, the workflow instead searched for and exfiltrated credentials. It targeted secrets available to GitHub Actions, but also searched repository files and complete Git history for credentials associated with cloud providers and AI services. That meant credentials developers had previously committed and later removed could still be discovered. The incident is another reminder that responding to exposed credentials requires more than cleaning up source code. Organizations need to understand where credentials have been exposed, remediate those credentials and ultimately improve how they are managed. HCP Vault Radar and HashiCorp Vault can help teams address different parts of that lifecycle, moving from discovering exposed secrets to bringing credentials under centralized management. A deleted secret can still be an exposed secret Accidentally committing a credential is not an unusual scenario in software development. An API key gets added to a configuration file while testing an integration, a cloud credential helps get a prototype running, or a token is placed into a workflow to solve an immediate problem. A developer may eventually identify the mistake and remove the credential, leaving the current version of the application looking clean. But removing the plaintext value does not necessarily remediate the underlying credential. The secret can remain in Git history, the original credential may still be active, and copies may exist in other places across the development lifecycle. In this attack, that distinction was parti

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Advisories de Vendor

Sin señales clasificadas en esta categoría dentro de la ventana seleccionada.

También en el Intel CenterCloud & Identity1Monitor4
3
GitLab3
Salesforce3
Ivanti2
HashiCorp2

Por qué importa

Postura cloud / identity comprometida o reforzada. Revisar configuración y baseline.

Acción recomendada

Avisa a los owners de los stacks GitHub, HashiCorp.

Vendors:GitHubHashiCorpCISO · Cloud Security · SecOps
Publicado
17 nov 2026, 08:00
Actualizado
17 nov 2026, 22:01
Detectado
17 nov 2026, 22:01
Fuente
HashiCorp Blog Security
Referencia técnica
Original advisory
HashiCorp Blog Security
Prioridad · 42/100published <24h (+40) · high severity (+15) · source authority (+2) · updated <24h (+5 cap)
hace 8 horas
MonitorMONITORAltoIncidente (prensa)NEWInteligencia operacional

Thousands of GitHub repos hit with secret-stealing malware

Researchers have uncovered a campaign in which hijacked GitHub accounts spread secret-stealing malware across thousands of repositories. The payload executed in at least 1,806 repos, exfiltrating CI/CD secrets and cloud credentials. Aikido Security, which detected and documented the campaign, said the attackers used the 4,837 compromised accounts to open probe pull requests in 61,764 repositories starting Nov. 10. Around 92% of those pull requests, titled “docs: dependency audit notes,” are still open, which suggests most project owners have not seen them. However, the probes on their own are benign and were performed only to check whether the hijacked accounts had write-access in those repos so that the attackers could follow up with commits that contained the malicious payload: a 1,500-line shell script that collects GitHub Actions secrets, cloud credentials, and API keys for AI services and developer tools. The payload was delivered using at least three methods: modification of existing GitHub Actions workflows, adding a postinstall hook in the package.json file that runs it on any npm install and creating a throw-away branch with a rogue Actions workflow to be run. “We’ve identified indications that the payload ran in at least 1,806 repositories, but this number may understate impact,” the Aikido researchers said in their report. “The run log was deleted in impacted repositories, meaning the threat actor has likely collected the credentials and covered its tracks.” The npm hook that slipped past GitHub GitHub’s safeguard against this kind of attack worked as designed for the payloads it could see. The platform has blunted recent workflow-injection campaigns by requiring explicit approval before the malicious workflows run, and GitGuardian found that all seven of the November payload runs still visible in workflow files sat in an action_required state and never started. “GitHub held the workflow forms, but an npm hook slipped past the hold and ran,” Gaetan Ferry,

Por qué importa

Señal informativa — sin acción inmediata.

Acción recomendada

Avisa a los owners de los stacks GitHub.

Vendors:GitHubCISO · SecOps
Mapeo regulatorio · riesgo 78

El robo confirmado de secretos y credenciales exige a las entidades financieras afectadas detectar, gestionar, clasificar y revisar el incidente conforme a DORA.

DORA · Art. 10 Detection (direct) · Art. 13 Learning and evolving (direct) · Art. 17 ICT-related incident management process (direct)
Publicado
13 nov 2026, 23:53
Actualizado
14 nov 2026, 00:00
Detectado
14 nov 2026, 00:00
Fuente
CSO Online
Referencia técnica
Original advisory
CSO Online
Prioridad · 31/100published <7d (+25) · high severity (+15) · source authority (+2) · updated <7d (+3 cap)
hace 4 días
MonitorMONITORAltoIncidenteNEWInteligencia operacional

Hackers compromise 4,800 GitHub accounts to steal cloud credentials

A new campaign dubbed 'wfx-loot' has unfolded on GitHub where threat actors used 4,837 compromised accounts to probe 61,764 repositories, open pull requests, and push secrets-stealing malware. [...]

Por qué importa

Señal informativa — sin acción inmediata.

Acción recomendada

Avisa a los owners de los stacks GitHub.

Vendors:GitHubCISO · SecOps
Mapeo regulatorio · riesgo 70

El compromiso masivo de cuentas y la exfiltración de credenciales cloud requieren detectar, registrar, clasificar y gestionar formalmente un posible incidente TIC.

DORA · Art. 10 Detection (direct) · Art. 13 Learning and evolving (direct) · Art. 17 ICT-related incident management process (direct)
Publicado
12 nov 2026, 22:25
Actualizado
13 nov 2026, 01:00
Detectado
13 nov 2026, 01:00
Fuente
BleepingComputer
Referencia técnica
Original advisory
BleepingComputer
Prioridad · 31/100published <7d (+25) · high severity (+15) · source authority (+2) · updated <7d (+3 cap)
hace 5 días
MonitorMONITORAltoIncidente (prensa)NEWInteligencia operacional

Attacker Targets 60,000 GitHub Repositories in Credential Theft Campaign

Using thousands of hijacked accounts, the wfx-loot campaign planted a CI secret stealer that ran in over 1,800 GitHub repositories. The post Attacker Targets 60,000 GitHub Repositories in Credential Theft Campaign appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Por qué importa

Señal informativa — sin acción inmediata.

Acción recomendada

Avisa a los owners de los stacks GitHub.

Vendors:GitHubCISO · SecOps
Mapeo regulatorio · riesgo 65

La campaña evidencia compromiso de cuentas y posible exfiltración de secretos en CI/CD, lo que exige detección, gestión y clasificación del incidente bajo DORA si afecta a una entidad financiera.

DORA · Art. 10 Detection (direct) · Art. 13 Learning and evolving (direct) · Art. 15 Further harmonisation of ICT risk management tools, methods, processes and policies (direct)
Publicado
12 nov 2026, 13:39
Actualizado
12 nov 2026, 17:00
Detectado
12 nov 2026, 17:00
Fuente
SecurityWeek
Referencia técnica
Original advisory
SecurityWeek
Prioridad · 31/100published <7d (+25) · high severity (+15) · source authority (+2) · updated <7d (+3 cap)
hace 6 días
MonitorMONITORAltoIncidente (prensa)NEWInteligencia operacional

Check your GitHub repos: A secret stealer hit tens of thousands of them

A threat actor using stolen GitHub credentials has pushed a credential-stealing payload into tens of thousands of repositories since November 10. In more than 1,800 of them, the malware ran and shipped GitHub Actions secrets and cloud credentials to the attacker. Aikido spotted the campaign and named it wfx-loot. The name comes from the attacker’s own labels, “wfx” for the malware and “loot” for what it steals. Aikido counted 4,837 compromised accounts opening probe pull … More → The post Check your GitHub repos: A secret stealer hit tens of thousands of them appeared first on Help Net Security.

Por qué importa

Señal informativa — sin acción inmediata.

Acción recomendada

Avisa a los owners de los stacks GitHub.

Vendors:GitHubCISO · SecOps
Mapeo regulatorio · riesgo 85

La exfiltración confirmada de secretos de GitHub Actions y credenciales cloud exige detectar, gestionar y clasificar el incidente TIC conforme a DORA.

DORA · Art. 10 Detection (direct) · Art. 17 ICT-related incident management process (direct) · Art. 18 Classification of ICT-related incidents and cyber threats (direct)
Publicado
12 nov 2026, 09:24
Actualizado
12 nov 2026, 11:00
Detectado
12 nov 2026, 11:00
Fuente
Help Net Security
Referencia técnica
Original advisory
Help Net Security
Prioridad · 31/100published <7d (+25) · high severity (+15) · source authority (+2) · updated <7d (+3 cap)
hace 6 días

Cobertura de fuentes degradada

64 de 72 fuentes elegibles del scouter tienen una lectura correcta en las últimas 24 h. 8 registran fallos; 0 no tienen un éxito registrado. Estas categorías pueden solaparse.

El scouter está programado cada hora. Una ejecución o la ausencia de señales no garantiza cobertura completa ni ausencia de exposición.

Estado consultado: 18/11/2026, 6:01:22 UTC · catálogo del scouter; otros conectores se actualizan por separado.